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John V Jacobi and Nicole Huberfeld
he Institute of Medicine (1OM) has returned the prob-
lem of medical error to the top of the health-care
age da. Its report that 44,000 to 98,000 pa ients die
each year as a result of medical errors in American hospitals
has renewed scholarly interest in health system quality con-
trol.1 In To Err Is Human, the IOM provides a vivid picture
of a health-care system riven with serious quality problems.
It calls for systems-based error-reduction methods borrowed
from other high-risk industries and forcefully argues against
the traditional tendency to assign accountability primarily to
individual physicians. Most errors, the IOM argues, can be
successfully addressed by engineering systemic fail-safe pro-
tections against the inevitable failings of human actors.
Medical malpractice litigation serves important com-
pensatory and quality-improvement roles for victims of
medical negligence. 2 But the malpractice system's effective-
ness is impaired by its narrow focus and its impulse to blame
individual physicians for medical injuries. Can medical mal-
practice law be brought into harmony with system-focused
error-reduction theory, as advocated by the IOM report? Legal
theorists have long advocated a shift from individual physi-
cian liability to enterprise liability as a means of improving
medical quality oversight - a shift now cautiously endorsed
by the IOM.1 Enterprise liability seems to meld well with
the prescription for a shift in accountability from individuals
to systems by placing liability-driven incentives on organiza-
tions with both sufficient scope and organizational control
to address system errors. The attention the IOM has drawn
to the problem of medical error may renew policymakers'
interest in enterprise liability.
In this article, we examine the potential of enterprise
liability in light of current health-care finance realities. We
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begin by addressing background issues of medical malprac-
tice theory and the development of proposals for a form of
plan-based enterprise medical liability centered on managed
care organizations (MCOs). We then describe recent trends
in the evolution of more loosely structured MCOs, includ-
ing the emergence of "disintermediated," or patient-directed,
plans. We examine the extent to which these developments
weaken the rationales for plan-based enterprise liability. We
conclude nevertheless that plan-based enterprise liability best
serves the goal of reducing medical injury by permitting a
focus on entities with sufficient scope to translate liability
pressure into support for systemic risk-reduction measures.
Advancing plan-based enterprise liability in an era of disen-
gaged MCOs will require an extension of tort liability to
firms with little control but much influence over their busi-
ness partners.
I. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM
AND QUALITY CONTROL
The general strengths and weaknesses of the medical mal-
practice system are well developed in scholarly literature
and will only be summarized here. In the current context, it
must be observed that malpractice actions are not exclu-
sively, or even primarily, about quality control; rather, they
are intended to provide compensation for losses flowing from
negligent medical injury. Three major justifications exist for
the current medical malpractice system. First, our society
has deemed it proper for an innocent victim to recover her
losses from the person who negligently caused her injury
Second, society at large is served to the extent the mal-
practice system assures that a negligently injured person
will not be rendered destitute, and socially unproductive,
for want of funds to finance needed medical and rehabilita-
tive care. Third, the malpractice system purports to deter
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negligent health-care providers from performing substandard
care in the future.
The first and second justifications, compensation of the
innocent victim and prevention of destitute citizens, are far
from perfect in their execution. Malpractice litigation is an
expensive process for all participants in terms of the finan-
cial costs of litigation, the time spent resolving claims, and
the delays experienced in clearing claims.' The malpractice
system is, like the tort system generally, "an exceedingly costly
insurance system."' In addition, as the Harvard Study re-
searchers concluded, the malpractice system is remarkably
imprecise in identifying those injured persons most deserv-
ing of recovery for negligent medical injury 6 This imprecision
is evidenced in at least two ways: The number of malprac-
tice claims filed is dwarfed by the number of serious negligent
injuries suffered, and the malpractice cases resulting in some
recovery frequently do not involve evidence of an actual neg-
ligent cause of injury. The compensation aspect of the
malpractice system seems, then, to suffer from underinclusion
of negligently injured persons and from imprecise sorting
between valid and invalid claims. 7 This imprecision and
expense in the malpractice system has led, in part, to the call
for alternative compensation systems for victims of medical
error, including various forms of enterprise liability.8
The third justification for the medical malpractice sys-
tem is deterrence of negligent injury, or reduction in medical
errors. The deterrence function is assumed to underpin neg-
ligence law in general, 9 and malpractice law in particular."'
The rationale of the deterrent effect can be articulated as a
four-part causal chain.
First, a patient suffers a medical injury under circum-
stances suggesting that the physician may have deviated from
norms of professional conduct. The compensation poten-
tially available to the injured patient provides the incentive
for the patient to bring the claim forward.
Second, experts testify and jurors contemplate whether
the injury was caused by an unexcused deviation from pro-
fessional standards of care. In this trial process, the
defendant-physician's conduct is compared to peer-derived
norms.
Third, the jury assesses liability (or not), providing a
public, societal judgment as to the point at which departure
from peer standards merits sanction. In theory, then, a
plaintiff's verdict and consequent money judgment deters
the defendant-physician from departing from professional
standards in the future."
Fourth, the broader physician population is deterred
through a simple feedback process. Physicians practice pur-
suant to their understanding of appropriate professional norms.
They learn of malpractice judgments, which purport to hew
to professional norms, and the accretion of these judgments
creates a text from which physicians may infer the standard
by which society will judge their conduct. The monetary
awards to plaintiffs provide the incentive for physicians to
obtain knowledge of judgments and to conform their con-
duct to the standards on which those judgments were based.12
In practice, however, well-understood limitations im-
pede both the specific and the general deterrent effects. From
a psychological perspective, the utility of liability judgments
as a deterrent depends on an actor's having a high degree of
certainty that the sanction will result from a deviation from
professional norms. 3 From an economic perspective, the
success of liability judgments as a deterrent depends on a
threat of financial loss that is convincing enough to motivate
an actor to alter his behavior to avoid the injury.'4
While even harsh critics agree that the malpractice sys-
tem deters some disfavored conduct,15 the deterrent effect of
any negligence regime is diminished (under either a psycho-
logical or economic analysis) to the extent the regime fails to
directly link the sanction with the disfavored behavior.1 6 The
disconnect between substandard conduct and incurring sanc-
tions in the malpractice system is caused by at least four
elements. First, substandard practice does not result in li-
ability if the patient does not suffer an injury. 7 Second, only
a small percentage of patients suffering a negligent injury
ever file a claim. 8 The failure to file may be the result of the
patient's lack of notice of the negligent injury19 or a pre-
litigation judgment by attorneys that the case is not
economically rewarding after comparing possible recovery
to potential contingent fees.20 Third, the common law negli-
gence theory of setting enforceable standards through the
accretion of fact-specific cases does not feasibly permit phy-
sicians to discern discrete rules that are useful to their practice
of medicine.2' Fourth, the large majority of tort cases, in-
cluding malpractice cases, are settled before trial, thus
impeding the system's public rule-setting function. 22
Despite its pitfalls, the malpractice system does provide
some marginal effect in deterring medical injury.23 Its ineffi-
ciency and narrow orientation toward physician fault limit
its utility, however. Theorists, joined now by the IOM, have
argued that one relatively simple means of achieving im-
provement would be to shift the focus of malpractice
liability from the individual physician to the institution. This
shift in focus is purported to hold the potential to improve
the performance of the medical malpractice system and bring
it into harmony with the systemic orientation of the error-
reduction movement.
II. ENTERPRISE L riTY
A. Development of enterprise liability theory
Tort theorists have advocated a shift in focus in personal
injury law for several decades. Particularly in the products
liability area, assigning liability to a large enterprise (usually
the manufacturer of the product) is argued to improve the
tort system by reducing transaction costs and by improving
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the deterrent effect, thereby reducing the frequency and se-
verity of accidents. 24 The movement toward enterprise liability
has been gradual, as new theories against enterprises supple-
ment, but do not replace, existing causes of action against
individuals on the same set of facts. In health-care law, the
natural candidate for enterprise liability has been the hospi-
tal; here, too, the process has been evolutionary and
cumulative, with old claims against physicians and new claims
against hospitals existing side-by-side.
Tort law has evolved over recent decades to increase the
theories under which hospitals can be found responsible for
patient injuries. For example, hospitals have been found vi-
cariously responsible for the negligence of their physicians
through theories of ostensible agency and apparent authority,
even when the physicians were independent contractors. 2
Hospitals have also been found directly liable for patient
injuries when they failed to credential and supervise physi-
cians properly26 or when they failed to ensure that facilities
and equipment necessary for patient care were reasonably
available. 27 The courts, albeit in a "piecemeal and erratic"
fashion, have "channeled" medical liability toward the hos-
pital enterprise. 28
Enterprise liability theorists have moved farther away
from traditional medical malpractice norms. The American
Law Institute (ALI), in its 1991 report recommending enter-
prise liability for medical malpractice, recognized the
developments in common law toward hospital liability.29
However, the report advocated "a much sharper break with
the status quo," proposing to go beyond adding hospital li-
ability to that of physician liability. The ALL recommended
exclusive hospital liability in cases in which the physician
negligently caused medical injury in a hospital, thereby ex-
culpating the physician from legal liability." The ALI settled
on the hospital as the focus of liability for at least two rea-
sons. First, the common law has been moving in that direction;
and second, the hospital is the entity responsible for organiz-
ing complex patient care and is the site at which most of the
incidents giving rise to malpractice litigation have occurred.31
The stronger form of enterprise liability would desig-
nate the hospital as the sole defendant in most malpractice
cases.3 2 Reducing the number of defendants to one could
simplify the litigation process, speed the delivery of compen-
sation to successful litigants, and increase the proportion of
the recovery that goes to the malpractice victim. In short,
enterprise liability is expected to reduce transactions costs.33
But enterprise liability also holds promise as a means to
improve the medical malpractice system's deterrent effect,
thereby potentially reducing medical injury.
B. Deterrent effect
The malpractice insurance system contains elements that
inherently interfere with the corrective signals sent to physi-
cians via malpractice litigation. As described above, only a
very small percentage of victims of negligent medical error
file malpractice claims, which could lead to underdeterrence.
Nevertheless, a deterrence scheme can be effective, even if it
significantly underdetects faulty conduct, if it includes both
significant penalties and publication of punishments. This
the malpractice litigation system arguably does, because the
size of malpractice judgments, coupled with the significant
non-financial costs to defendant-physicians, packs a signifi-
cant wallop.3 4 The malpractice insurance system, however,
shields physicians from the blow in a way that impairs the
litigation system's deterrcnt effect.
We are not arguing that liability insurance does not
provide an important protection for physicians, who face
a great deal of uncertainty under the current liability system.
For instance, injuries can result from a momentary slip that
even the most careful physician cannot guard against;33 a
lapse in skill or judgment can lead to a malpractice action
only if it happens to cause an injury;36 many of those who
are injured never sue;37 those who do file claims are fre-
quently not victims of negligence;38 and the amount of each
judgment is related not to the degree of fault or egregious-
ness of the medical error committed, but rather to the
severity of the resulting injury and to entirely exogenous
factors, such as the age, class, and social responsibilities of
the injured patient. 39 In the face of such uncertainty, liability
insurance is an absolute necessity if physicians are to prac-
tice without the threat of imminent bankruptcy hanging over
their heads.
But if physicians are insulated by insurance from the
financial effects of liability judgments, insurance becomes
the enemy of deterrence in the quality context. 40 If insurance
premiums were associated with past experience, insurance
could shield the insured from unpredictable losses, while
still maintaining substantial incentives to avoid injuries.41 But
malpractice insurance underwriters rarely use past experi-
ence as an element of premium pricing. Instead, they tend to
charge uniform premiums, varying them only on the basis of
practice specialty and geographic location.42 In addition, the
insurance is often "first dollar," with physicians bearing few
co-payment or deductible responsibilities. 43 Physicians are
thus completely insulated from the financial effects of mal-
practice judgments, and the looked-for deterrent effect of
malpractice actions is "diluted." 44 This feature of malprac-
tice insurance does not arise from inattention or corruption;
it is a function of the difficult or impossible task of making
valid actuarial judgments about future physician malpractice
incidence on the basis of past experience.
4
These actuarial difficulties do not apply in writing
malpractice insurance for hospitals. Hospitals are involved
in a much larger volume of treatments than any individual
physician, and they are therefore subjected to a propor-
tionately larger number of malpractice claims. This regular
and large volume of experience allows insurers to amass
adequate data to tie hospitals' malpractice premiums to their
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actual history of claims, thus permitting hospitals to oc-
cupy the "middle ground" in which they enjoy some
protection from uncontrollable losses, while their ability
to control the incidence of claims is rewarded by modera-
tion of malpractice premium rates. 46 A sufficiently large
hospital has enough volume and claims experience to form
its own actuarial pool. Increasingly, such institutions take
advantage of their scale by electing to self-insure, in which
case the rewards for reducing claims is obvious and di-
rect.47 A shift in focus "from the individual physician to
the hospital ... could vastly increase injury-prevention in-
centives" otherwise frustrated by the malpractice insurance
underwriting system.
48
Enterprise liability thus has the potential to clarify the
economic signals sent by malpractice judgments. In a physi-
cian-oriented system, the signals are muffled by ubiquitous,
community-rated liability insurance.49 Hospitals incur a high
volume of claims; and actuarially valid, experience-rated
premiums, or self-insurance, are therefore feasible, permit-
ting premiums or liability costs to vary with claims
experience. This improvement might seem too abstract to
garner much interest were it not for the closely related and
more significant gain enterprise liability offers: The economic
signals will be transmitted to entities that are more capable
of using the data to achieve error reduction.
One potential effect of enterprise liability would be in-
creased scrutiny of, and pressure on, "accident-prone"
physicians.50 Physician-oriented malpractice insurance man-
ages to screen out only the very worst physicians. Hospitals
facing liability for injuries occurring within their walls would
have every incentive to screen out physicians committing
malpractice; further, they would have incentives to develop
valid mechanisms, such as peer review, to identify
underperforming physicians before they commit medical
errors."' Thus, the basic but bedeviling task of weeding out
(or limiting the practice of) physicians most likely to injure
would be better performed by hospitals in an enterprise li-
ability system.
The IOM, however, made a compelling case that reduc-
ing medical error is not so much about eliminating bad-apple
physicians as minimizing the likelihood and effect of human
error.12 In its report, the IOM focused on the experience of
"other high-risk industries" in which error-reduction efforts
long ago turned from blaming individual human actors to
anticipating - and building safety systems around - inevi-
table human failings.5 3
Similarly, the ALI's 1991 study urged a focus on error
reduction primarily through hospitals' organized and pro-
spective quality-improvement efforts as each hospital gained
the incentive to "use its organization levers" to improve care.1
4
The ALl study reasoned that enterprise liability would rely
on the organizational and professional capabilities of hospi-
tal medical staffs, nursing staffs, and other skilled agents to
improve safety:
[T] he inadvertent mishaps of the individual actor,
even if they are not deliberate and are only mini-
mally deterrable, are dangerous and need to be
contained to the extent possible. The best vehicle
for identifying and dealing with such incidents is
the organization in which the doctor practices.
The memory of the institution can serve to record
and piece together patterns in a host of apparently
idiosyncratic incidents. The collective wisdom of
the hospital team can be pooled to devise feasible
procedures for guarding against the ever-present
risk of occasional human failure by even the best
doctors...."
The ALl study also tied together the deterrence function and
the issue of hospitals' institutional competence to effect er-
ror reduction: "Not only does the organization have a greater
capacity to establish such quality assurance programs, but it
is also more likely to be influenced to do so by the incentives
created by tort liability." 6
Ultimately, advocates saw in hospitals the appropriate
locus of the liability system's deterrence efforts and orga-
mzed quality assurance activities.5 7 Hospitals directly organize
and deliver health care on a daily basis, and they necessarily
exercise close control over professional conduct, facilities,
supplies, and bureaucratic procedures.5 8 In concert with
accrediting bodies, they have for decades pursued formal
programs of institutional quality improvement.59 In addition,
some hospitals (usually major teaching institutions) pur-
sue sophisticated research on quality assurance.6 0
Enterprise liability theorists agree with this systems approach,
but some have shifted the spotlight from hospitals to health
insurers.
C. Shifting the enterprise liability focus
to health plans
The architects of the Clinton administration's ambitious health
reform effort incorporated enterprise liability into their plan
"as a demonstration project for improving the medical mal-
practice system."6 Like prior enterprise liability advocates,
they hoped to reform the malpractice system in order to
better serve quality-improvement goals.62 Although this ef-
fort moved enterprise liability to the national legislative agenda
for the first time, it advanced enterprise liability with a twist:
Instead of hospitals, health "plans," or MCOs, would be the
responsible entity against which malpractice claims would
be lodged 3. 6 This effort drew on the prior arguments in favor
of enterprise liability, recognizing the present "mismatch"
between physician fault and victim compensation, the high
transactions costs of the malpractice system, the failure of
liability insurance to risk-rate physicians, and the consequent
weakness of the system as a quality control measure.6' The
inclusion of enterprise liability in the Clinton plan marked a
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shift toward health plans as the proposed responsible entity
in malpractice litigation.
Evolution in the health-care delivery market precipitated
this change in focus, as hospitals' control over care was seen
to be waning, while that of plans was perceived to be on the
rise. Hospitals have become somewhat less likely to be
the site of malpractice as more and more complex proce-
dures are performed in outpatient settings. Researchers
from the National Center for Health Statistics performing
the National Health Care Survey recently reported on this
trend:
[M]any procedures that used to be performed only
on an inpatient basis are increasingly being per-
formed on an ambulatory basis.... In short, a very
different mix of operations were performed dur-
ing inpatient hospitalizations in 1998 than in 1985,
with a considerable increase in cardiac procedures
and less complex procedures shifting to ambula-
tory sites of care.
61
In response to this trend, one state, previously requiring
malpractice insurance only for physicians practicing in hos-
pitals, amended its professional code to require malpractice
coverage for physicians performing outpatient surgical pro-
cedures.66 Noting that hospitals were "losing patients to more
cost-effective ambulatory and home-based services,"67 and
that hospitals may not have effective control over practitio-
ners operating within their walls at any rate,68 scholars shifted
their focus to emerging and increasingly powerful managed
care financing entities.69
MCOs promised the development of health-care man-
agement structures that seemed to recommend them as ideal
candidates for enterprise liability - although it is important
to separate the promise from its execution. Taking the evolu-
tion of MCOs in an optimistic light, we see organizations
with a scale conducive to enterprise liability; they "can be
large enough to pool risk and reap economies of scale, ...
but small enough to allow effective coordination and man-
agement."7 ° Through their contractual relationships with
physicians and facilities, MCOs have the structural ability to
monitor and influence the provision of care.71 With this con-
nective tissue in place, the addition of enterprise liability
could be a catalyst to foster a cooperative quality-enhancing
relationship. Physicians would be insulated from the litiga-
tion system, and their fortunes would be tied to some
substantial degree (through contract) to the fate of the plan,
which would now be the sole focus of the malpractice sys-
tem. Under such circumstances, physicians may be more
willing to regard quality as a collective goal and be willing to
participate in systemic efforts to reduce errors.72 MCOs would
have the benefit of broad perspective to design such error-
reduction plans and to implement data systems and the "total
quality management" tools that have been effective in other
high-risk industries and that are finding applications in health-
care delivery.73
The advocacy of MCO-based enterprise liability has been
tentative and conditional, pending evidence that MCOs could
develop the quality-enhancing infrastructure needed for the
task and that they would exercise their market power in the
interest of quality improvement, rather than some other end.74
We turn next to examine the current state of MCOs' devel-
opment of quality-improving methods of management, or
what Clark Havighurst so aptly refers to as a "half-baked
revolution."7
Ill. DECENTRALIZATION AND DIsMnrERMEDIATION
IN HEALTH CARE
Advocates of enterprise liability believed that a focus on hos-
pitals would serve quality because hospitals had the levers to
control a wide variety of activity critical to reducing medical
errors, and they were properly incentivized to use them. As
the marketplace evolved, scholars and politicians shifted their
focus to MCOs. Enterprise liability was a sensible theoreti-
cal corrective to some of the faults of the malpractice system,
and MCOs occupy a position in the health-care finance and
delivery system such that they seem suitable candidates for
the role of responsible enterprises; that is, they have substan-
tial scale, broad connections with a variety of providers, and
the informational and technical capacity to monitor the quality
of complex systems. Recent history and apparent market
trends suggest a turn in MCO development, however, that
casts them in an unfavorable light as the ultimate guardians
of medical quality.
A. MCOs' unpredictable evolution
Ardor for plan-based enterprise liability was always quali-
fied by the observation that the plans suitable for a robust
quality assurance role did not yet exist. The hope - and the
explicit condition precedent to a firm endorsement of plan-
based enterprise liability - was that MCOs would develop
the management systems and vision necessary to the task of
overseeing quality improvement in the health-care delivery
system.76 Well-integrated (and well-run) plans would be ca-
pable of creating and maintaining "[i]nstitutional quality
improvement programs" because they could "view the qual-
ity of care they deliver in the aggregate, have the financial
resources to develop medical information systems, and ...
more easily implement programs for 'total quality manage-
ment' (TQM) or 'continuous quality improvement' (CQI)."77
The thoughtful advocates of plan-based liability fully recog-
nized the shortcomings of then-existing plans, but hoped for
evolving improvements.78
The evolution of managed care has taken it in the wrong
direction for enterprise-liability purposes. Health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) have largely evolved away from
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tightly controlled staff and group models to more loosely
organized network models.79 In response to consumers' con-
cerns about lack of choice among providers, many plan
sponsors have relaxed plan structures by offering preferred
provider organization and point-of-service options in addi-
tion to HMOs.8" As networks have loosened, plans have not
compensated for the loss in quality assurance capability with
"virtual integration" through information technology;81 in-
stead, they have focused almost single-mindedly on price
competition.8
2
A recent report from the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices confirms the failure of MCOs to take quality control
duties seriously.83 The OIG investigated the extent to which
MCOs report, as they are required to do by federal law,
adverse actions against physicians to the National Practitio-
ner Data Bank. The OIG studied a nine-year period during
the 1990s and discovered that 84 percent of MCOs never
reported an adverse event.8 4 The OIG acknowledged (with
understandable skepticism) that no reportable event had oc-
curred for those plans; but it also noted likely explanations,
such as the plans' turning away from a clinical oversight
role." It found that MCOs emphasize price, rather than quality;
they rely on broad overlapping panels of independent physi-
cians instead of staffs within the MCOs' control in response
to consumer demand for choice; and they rely on "down-
stream entities," including hospitals and physician groups,
to protect patients from dangerous physicians.8 6
The prospect for MCOs' taking aggressive quality con-
trol steps, within the current construct of enterprise liability,
is probably dim. As consumers become increasingly distrust-
ful of managed care plans, which they perceive as more
interested in cost than quality, they are likely to resist the
enhanced control over health-care delivery that MCOs would
need to serve a quality management function.8 7 As Jacob
Hacker and Theodore Marmor have recently described, it is
difficult even to settle on the terminology relevant to a dis-
cussion in this regard.88
The ability of plans to exert control depends on several
design choices that are not mutually exclusive, including the
extent to which choice of provider is limited, the aggressive-
ness with which utilization control is performed, and the
extent to which financial risk is shifted by the plans to inter-
mediate entities or directly to physicians and other providers.89
But the task of implementing effective quality assurance struc-
tures is a large one, and plans have fallen far short of the
expectations of those who saw them as engines of quality
control.
In a recent article, Clark Havighurst captured the depth
of the perceived failure of plans to organize themselves to
improve quality:
Although today's health plans and their subcon-
tractors have begun an important revolution, their
actual accomplishments to date fall short of the
goals envisioned for managed care when it first
came on the scene in the 1970s and 1980s.... [T]he
vision of health plans actually organizing and di-
rectly overseeing providers has not been realized....
[T]oday's health plans act almost exclusively as
general contractors at least once removed from
providers and the actual delivery of care.... In re-
ality, most plans are not rigorously selective in
their choice of subcontractors.... [M]anaged care
today means little more than subcontracting and
capitation."°
If we accept this as true - that managed care has developed
into an organized system of "subcontracting and capitation"
-the question becomes whether devolution prevents man-
aged care entities from responding to the need for quality
controls. The answer may be that, despite the direction of
managed care evolution described in the next section, re-
sponsibility may still be placed on the entity that is
responsible for finance if rejection of a "control" model is
accomplished.
B. Emergence of the "anti-HMO"
A recent development in health-care finance puts a fine point
on the various observations that managed care is devolving.
The trend toward "patient-directed care" illustrates how the
tight reins of HMOs have caused a backlash toward decen-
tralization. Because this development in health-care finance
is both nascent and Internet-based, we cannot predict whether
patient-directed care is a mere blip on the health-care screen
or if it is microcosmic of a larger decentralization trend.
Nevertheless, this development illustrates the need for alter-
ing enterprise liability theory to accommodate a less structured
form of managed care.
The patient-directed care movement incorporates two
still-developing elements, one concerning defined-contribu-
tion (as opposed to defined-benefit) health plans, and the
other concerning increased consumer control, which can be
described as a trend toward "disintermediated" plans. In the
former, employers shift the means by which they determine
the funding level of their contribution toward employee health
benefits. In the latter, the role of the fiscal intermediary be-
tween employees and their health providers (e.g., an MCO
or an administrative services organization retained by a self-
funded employer) is reduced or eliminated.
The movement to a defined-contribution model of em-
ployer funding, while possibly troubling from an employee's
perspective, would not necessarily mean a substantial change
in plan design for enterprise liability purposes. Defined-con-
tribution plans borrow from the now-familiar shift in
retirement benefits to 401(k) plans, in which employees forego
fixed-dollar pensions in favor of regular contributions to a
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retirement account, with the employee both directing the
investment of the funds (usually within a range of options)
and bearing the risk that the invested funds will grow more
or less rapidly than expected. In the health coverage area, the
concept is similar. Most employers now offer defined-ben-
efit coverage, in which employees receive the promise of a
set array of services, either at no cost to the employee or at a
set employee cost. A shift to a defined-contribution plan would
mean employees instead receive the promise of a set finan-
cial contribution toward the cost of health care, with the
consequence of spending any balance - large, small, or un-
certain - the responsibility of the employee.9 1 As the cost of
health premiums once again rises,92 employers see defined-
contribution plans as a means of capping their health insurance
costs, facilitating predictability, if not cost-containment.93
In practice, a shift to defined-contribution plans may
result in little change from current practices. Many employ-
ees are already responsible for a substantial portion of their
health-care premium, and many employers have been shift-
ing more of the cost of health coverage to their employees,
even under the so-called defined-benefit model.9 4 It may be,
then, that employees will simply feel a slightly different form
of incentive to choose a less expensive health plan.95 This
mild modification in current practice would have little effect
on the role of plans in the health-care delivery system, al-
though it may lead to a reallocation of the cost of care between
the employer and employee. 96
In some defined-contribution models, employers would
provide "vouchers" to employees and permit them total free-
dom in choosing an insurer in the individual market. 97 Deep
flaws in the individual insurance market would seem to coun-
sel against this option; for example, premiums in the
individual market are substantially higher than those in
the group market. 98 In addition, premiums for individual
insurance in most states vary dramatically depending on fac-
tors such as age, family composition, and medical history.99
If vouchers are in equal face amounts for each employee,
then they would be worth less for employees with higher
risk profiles who use them in the non-group market. Com-
plex schemes involving a version of risk adjustment for
vouchers are proposed to compensate for this problem. 100
The cost for such risk adjustment is not yet quantified in
published sources. In combination, the added cost of indi-
vidual (instead of group) coverage and of retrofitting the
individual market to mimic group insurance for risk adjust-
ment purposes will be daunting. 01
The most intriguing aspect of patient-directed care could
be characterized as the "anti-HMO""°2 - the disinter-
mediated health plan. Although many variations exist, some
of which are more firmly established as concepts than as
business plans, the heart of disintermediation is that it
"enable[s] employers to bypass health plans altogether in
managing their health benefits."' 13 One consulting firm touts
the idea in the following terms:
Powered by the Intemet, today's growing consumer
market is driving toward a new way of providing,
paying for and transacting health care. We are see-
ing the elimination of the middleman between the
consumer and the caregiver (disintermediation) and
the shift, by employers, from defined-benefit to
defined-contribution health plans (devolution).' 4
While the Internet will permit interesting new means of gath-
ering and transmitting information in the health-care
industry,0 and many of the new businesses discussing
disintermediated health plans have Internet features in their
products, 06 the innovative aspects of these health plans
for purposes of this article do not depend on the Internet
features.
Disintermediated plans are often described as a part of
the managed care "backlash."' 17 They permit employees free,
or at least broad, choice of providers, and leave the contract-
ing issues with respect to the provision of care to the employee
and the provider; they generally favor direct patient control
to any form of guidance or control by an employer or third-
party intermediary.0 8 They have been called "do-it-yourself"
networks, or "HMOs'P'Us.com."" 9 Although they bear a
resemblance to medical savings accounts,"0 these plans are
being offered in settings in which medical savings accounts
may not be offered. For example, Medtronic, a $5 billion
publicly traded company, is offering its employees:
[T]he option to choose a personal care account
plan through Definity Health.... [Medtronic] pro-
vides funds that go toward medical services....
Employees can only use the money for health care,
and any money that is not spent rolls over into the
next year. Under this plan, workers cannot keep
the funds should they leave the company. Once
the worker exhausts the money and the deduct-
ible, Medtronic pays the rest of the worker's medi-
cal bills."'
Many of the firms offering the cluster of services that
comprise disintermediated plans offer similar product de-
scriptions. Definity Health, Lumenos, and HealthMarket all
describe a package in which employees would obtain an
account from which they could fund health care of their
choice from providers of their choice. The accounts are vari-
ously called "personal care accounts," "health savings
accounts," and "HealthMarket savings accounts."" 2 Any funds
not expended in the year they are deposited by the employer
"roll over" and remain in the employee's account, although
they apparently may be used only for health purchases.13
The firms also offer various informational services - all, of
course, available on the Internet - through which employ-
ees may obtain information about health-care providers and
receive health educational materials.14
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The buzzword for each of these firms is "choice."
"[C]onsumers choose how to spend their health benefits dol-
lars.... Consumers select providers and care options, including
alternative medicine."ls "Consumers today have high ex-
pectations: They're decision-makers; they're self-reliant." '116
"[Y]ou and your doctor can fulfill your health-care needs
better than an insurance company."' 17 These firms sell them-
selves as an opportunity for employees (if sponsored for
membership by their employer) to evade control of MCOs
altogether by exercising direct decision-making authority over
the care they receive and the physicians who will provide
that care. 18
It is unclear how many subscribers such firms have en-
rolled at this point. It is clear that, while there is no stampede
to move from insured models (including MCOs) to
disintermediated plans, there is a genuine buzz about these
models among employers and human resources managers.
These plans seem to cater to the interest among employers to
contain, or at least make predictable, their health budgets,
and to "distance themselves from health care decisions" in
order to avoid possible liability concerns."8 In addition, these
plans have positioned themselves as bastions of choice and
consumer control - in contrast to the reviled managed care
plans.120
Will they "work"? The answer to that question depends
on what we are using to measure success. One easy answer
is that these plans present many of the detriments and pos-
sible benefits of medical savings accounts, the social
accounting on which is still outstanding. 2' But, while inter-
esting, the issue is not whether defined-contribution plans in
their current incarnation will last. They simply illustrate the
need to redefine who is responsible for quality and why,
regardless of the ever-changing managed care market. Few
will debate the conclusion that managed care is continuing
to evolve, or devolve, and has not found an apex (or a nadir).
Today's managed care entities are far from the original HMO
model that started in California. 122 The reins have been loos-
ened consistently over time. What was once a model of
unified, centralized, preventative care has become a means
for reimbursement through "subcontracting and capitation."
Patient-directed care - whether in the form of defined-con-
tribution plans, more extreme disintermediated models, or
another incarnation altogether in the future - represents a
spectrum of possible arrangements along which health-care
finance has been moving and will likely continue to move. 123
Accepting the idea of a spectrum and the inability (per-
haps) of the health-care finance industry to settle on a model
suggest a need to position the responsibility for quality assur-
ance in a place that is not likely to continuously move along
that spectrum. In the next section, we examine more par-
ticularly the effect that the evolution of the managed care
industry has on the viability of plan-based enterprise liability
and explain an altered formulation of the rationale for enter-
prise liability that accommodates the managed care evolution.
IV PLAN-BASED ENTERPRISE Ltaumrry AND
MEDicAL ERRoRs
The time is ripe for a shift to enterprise medical liability.
The evidence of high rates of medical error have focused the
nation's attention on the need for systematic risk reduction.
Enterprise liability meshes well with proposed programmatic
steps to achieve safer care. The evolution of health-care de-
livery away from hospitals to outpatient settings highlights
MCOs as entities with the suitable scope of operation to
receive and distribute the incentives produced in an enter-
prise liability system. This section will describe the suitability
of MCOs for this task, explore the effect of the decentraliza-
tion of managed care, and argue that plan-basec liability
should nevertheless be pursued. While MCOs have largely
lost their ability to control health-care providers' risky con-
duct, they have retained their ability to influence them to
accept the systemic error-reduction measures sure to flow
from the IOM's initiative.
A. The fit
The right need not be the enemy of the good in error reduc-
tion. The medical malpractice system seeks to provide
compensation to victims of medical injury and to correct and
deter health-care providers who cause such injury. Enterprise
liability, whether as a modest evolution of the negligence-
based tort system,1 24 or as a more dramatic shift to no-fault
methods,' 1s hews to these goals. Enterprise liability attempts
to improve the justice system by more efficiently serving the
goals of compensation and deterrence. The IOM has invigo-
rated the health system's error-reduction movement. This
movement seeks to shift the perspective of error reduction
from the instantaneous conduct of the provider when the
error occurs to the longer-range context of the organization
that permits - or does not engineer against - human error.
Both enterprise liability tort theorists and the error-reduc-
tion movement target systems of a scale sufficient to effect
changes in order to reduce the number and severity of acci-
dents. Properly perceived, these movements can work hand
in hand.
In the last few years, researchers have attempted to cre-
ate a taxonomy of medical error in order to examine whether
different remedies may be effective for different types of er-
ror.126 Some errors are "slips," unplanned deviations from
intended conduct; some are "lapses," unplanned failures to
carry out intended conduct; and some are "mistakes," fail-
ures in planning such that there is no deviation from intended
conduct, but the planned conduct is "inadequate to achieve
the intended objective." 127 Errors can further be divided on
the basis of the characteristics of the provider: "Some health
care providers are incompetent, impaired or corrupt and make
errors repeatedly despite multiple attempts at remediation.
On the other hand, even the most highly trained and profi-
cient professionals occasionally make mistakes. '12
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Would a shift to plan-based enterprise liability help to
identify "incompetent, impaired or corrupt" physicians?
Health plans would certainly have an incentive to screen out
bad doctors if MCOs were held responsible for their errors.
Plans would not, however, be in a position to pass direct
clinical judgment on physicians' practices. As Abraham and
Weiler have pointed out, plans are "one step removed from
the actual delivery of care," and their information and influ-
ence would therefore be indirect. 129 As we described above,
this attenuation has only increased in recent years, and plans
are likely to serve even less well in the future as direct or
reliable conduits of clinical information. Plans could use
data systems to correct for this deficit; for instance, they
could monitor error rate by accumulating data of malprac-
tice claims. History shows this to be no innovation, however,
because malpractice carriers have had this capability and,
while they can obviously identify the extreme outliers, they
have found that the collectible data lacks sufficient statistical
and actuarial power to predict future claims experience for
most physicians. 13 0
The emphasis of the IOM, however, is on the lapses and
mistakes by qualified, conscientious providers. It has con-
cluded that addressing the source of systemic errors - the
conditions in the health-care delivery system that make hu-
man error and medical injury more likely to occur - is the
key to quality improvement."'3 Even the "slip" or "lapse" of
an individual physician is capable of being placed in the
"systems" context for error-reduction purposes. James Rea-
son describes this perspective in the following terms:
The basic premise in the system approach is that
humans are fallible and errors are to be expected,
even in the best organizations. Errors are seen as
consequences rather than causes, having their ori-
gins not so much in the perversity of human na-
ture as in "upstream" systemic factors.... Coun-
termeasures are based on the assumption that
though we cannot change the human condition,
we can change the conditions under which hu-
mans work. A central idea is that of system de-
fenses. All hazardous technologies possess barri-
ers and safeguards. When an adverse event oc-
curs, the important issue is not who blundered,
but how and why the defenses failed.' 32
An example of preventable error - drug errors (e.g.,
the administration of the wrong drug or of the right drug in
the wrong dosage) - often involves a "slip" by a physician
(e.g., she writes the prescription incorrectly).133 For an injury
to occur, at least one other "slip" or "lapse" might occur
(e.g., the pharmacist fails to catch the error). If the process of
prescribing medications is regarded as a systemic issue, how-
ever, the analysis can treat a drug error as a "mistake" - that
is, as an indication of a systemic failure to plan; here, a
failure to plan for human error. A focus on the individual
would blame the physician for her error and provide incen-
tives (through, perhaps, individual malpractice liability) for
her to avoid such errors in the future. A systems approach
would assume the possibility of human error and engineer
fail-safe mechanisms to catch them before they occur - for
example, by employing computerized drug order entry sys-
tems with software capable of screening for a high percentage
of drug errors caused by human "slips." 1
34
Enterprise liability is, from this perspective, a superior
approach for assessing liability for medical errors. Unlike
the traditional malpractice approach, which ordinarily be-
gins and ends its analysis with the actions of an individual
physician, enterprise liability contemplates an enterprise of
a scope sufficient to permit meaningful systems analysis.
Theoretically, over a course of time, the enterprise can use
its experience in many medical injury cases, or its internal
analyses undertaken in anticipation of potential medical in-
jury cases, to adjust the systems of care to prevent future
injuries by controlling for providers' lapses and mistakes.
The enterprise could use its control over the health-care de-
livery workplace and the data it aggregates by virtue of its
participation in a large number of medical cases-to correct
the "conditions that cause errors." 13
To the extent the malpractice system moves toward en-
terprise liability, it would be incorrect to say, as have Studdert
and Brennan recently, that the error-reduction movement is
on a "collision course with the medical malpractice sys-
tem." 3 6 The IOM advocated a shift in focus from "blaming
individuals." 13 7 But it recognized that simply identifying qual-
ity-improvement methods and publishing them to caring
professionals will not significantly advance the goals of error
reduction. Rather, the "external environment" must create
"pressures" or incentives for the health-care delivery system
to implement error-reduction methods.'38 The IOM declined
to undertake an assessment of malpractice reform proposals,
but it recognized that a shift to enterprise liability would be
conducive to achieving its goals of error reduction.'39 To the
extent the tort system moves toward enterprise liability, the
mechanisms of the tort system will align with those of the
error-reduction movement.
Plan-based enterprise liability appears to be a happy
marriage of finance and quality assurance structures. MCOs
have consequential control over providers and data-gather-
ing capabilities pursuant to their mission to organize networks
and control cost. They could use the "levers" employed for
cost containment to drive error reduction. In theory, MCOs
could use their "carefully negotiated contracts" with provid-
ers as "the basis for coordination of quality improvement
and accountability for error."140 MCOs could view care "in
the aggregate" and employ their financial resources to imple-
ment "organizational improvements." 14 1 The theory of
enterprise liability seems tailor-made for the systemic error-
reduction movement of which the IOM report is a part.
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B. The tension
The "fit" between the error-reduction movement and the
theory of plan-based enterprise liability is sufficiently ap-
pealing that it is appropriate to question the extent to which
the decentralization of MCOs frustrates a shift in the struc-
ture of the medical malpractice system. The evolution of
managed care structures described above seems to undercut
arguments in favor of plan-based enterprise liability from
both the legal and health administration perspectives.
Tort theorists' embrace of enterprise liability is premised
on its superiority in both providing compensation to victims
and creating incentives for error reduction. The former is
beyond the scope of this discussion. The error-reduction jus-
tification for enterprise liability springs from a
conceptualization of the tort system as a regulatory device by
which an enterprise (e.g., a manufacturer of a product) is
held responsible for injuries its commercial activity causes.
This assignment of responsibility is intended to impose risk-
reduction incentives on the organization producing the risky
activity or product. This imposition is justified by the fact
that the enterprise benefits from the ability to impose risk on
society and, thus, it might fairly be asked to shoulder the
burden when injuries result. The imposition is seen as sen-
sible because the designated organization has primary control
over the creation of the risk and the concomitant ability to
exercise that control to reduce the scope of the risk. 142
The ability of the responsible enterprise to exercise con-
trol over the conduct of others in order to reduce risk has
been an important underpinning of enterprise liability. This
control element is a common thread in the tort system's
extension of liability beyond active tortfeasors to achieve
safety ends. For example, liability has long been extended to
otherwise blameless employers and principals when their
employees or agents negligently cause harm, in large part
because the employer or principal is believed capable of ex-
ercising control over risk-causing conduct. 143 The ability of
health-care enterprises to control individuals' behavior, and
thereby reduce risk, similarly undergirds arguments for en-
terprise liability in medical malpractice." The incentive
argument is simple: Regulators (here, the tort system) inter-
ested in error reduction should focus on enterprises
empowered to control the conduct that creates risk. Applica-
tion of pressure on the enterprise will induce it to exercise
its control for the purpose of risk reduction. The diminution
of that ability to control weakens one major support for any
movement in the direction of enterprise liability.
From the health administration perspective, the decen-
tralization of managed care diminishes the impulse to look
to plans to drive error reduction. The IOM embraced the
need for incentives to create safety: "The combined goal of
the recommendations is for the external environment to cre-
ate sufficient pressure to make errors costly to health care
organizations and providers, so they are compelled to take
action to improve safety."14 Applying incentives to MCOs is
a sensible step in this direction to the extent MCOs are ca-
pable of achieving risk reduction. However, a degree of
organizational coherence has been seen as crucial to sys-
tems-based risk-reduction strategies. A recent study of hospital
performance in risk reduction identified successful safety
outcomes with a culture of shared goals, substantial admin-
istrative support for safety measures, strong leadership, and
good information systems.' 46 A trend away from centralized
control calls into question whether MCOs have these char-
acteristics.
The greater the distance between MCOs and the deliv-
ery of care, the more salient the cautions are against plan-based
enterprise liability. The attenuation of the relationship be-
tween MCO management and active care-givers raises
concerns that pressure applied to MCOs will fail to translate
to effective error reduction and may miscarry in the direc-
tion of inefficient or counterproductive consequences."'
MCOs that are not intimately engaged in the delivery of care
may react to error-reduction pressure simplistically - for
example, by "hanging out to dry" providers found to have
caused an injury, regardless of the consequence to the goals
of long-term safety. 1
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The argument for a marriage between plan-based enter-
prise liability and systematic medical error reduction is
strongest when MCOs are tightly integrated health-care de-
livery and finance organizations. Under such circumstances,
liability pressure serves both the historic tort interest in de-
terrence and the health administration goal of systems-focused
error reduction. As MCOs tend toward disengagement from
the control of health-care delivery, reexamination of the fit is
necessary.
C. Striking the balance
The explosion of work on systems-based error reduction in
an era of managed care presents an opportunity for coordina-
tion between the medical and legal systems that ought to be
pursued. Were the revolution in managed care not, as Clark
Havighurst correctly points out, "half-baked,"' 149 MCOs
would be capable of providing a degree of control over the
broad sweep of health-care delivery in a way that would
clearly match the goals of both the tort and health adminis-
tration systems.
We believe that plan-based enterprise liability remains a
plausible method of harmonizing the need for accountability
with the interest in avoiding the impulse to blame individu-
als. The scope of medical injury is large, and systems-based
responses are called for. Health care - even high-risk, intru-
sive health care - is increasingly provided in outpatient
settings, and hospitals are therefore an increasingly
underinclusive choice as a responsible enterprise for mal-
practice purposes. Plans are at an organizational apex in the
health-care delivery and finance system, and are therefore
structurally able to relate - as employer, principal, or con-
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
tracting partner - with all levels of the delivery system.
Even in their diffuse state, MCOs are in the best position to
focus liability pressure on error reduction. We focus on the
indirect authority that MCOs possess, which provides the
ability to influence rather than control; influence is a suffi-
cient basis under these circumstances to extend enterprise
liability to health plans.
MCOs control the payment for services by means of
various types of contract. Their ability to influence their con-
tracting partners as a condition of receiving payment is -
while more indirect than the power to direct, hire, and fire
- powerful. That influence is currently exercised to the end
of cost containment, and no structural reason exists to pre-
vent this influence from being employed to the end of error
reduction. We acknowledge that MCOs do not possess the
degree of control over direct providers of care that has his-
torically been associated with the extension of indirect tort
liability. Employers can fire employees; principals can dis-
charge agents. Both have historically wielded substantial
authority to dictate their subordinates' conduct. Neverthe-
less, MCOs have, in place of this power of control, the power
to influence.
The roots of enterprise liability in the tort system are
consistent with such nakedly instrumental justifications for
the assignment of liability. The goal of products liability law
is to employ liability (in part) to create incentives that push
manufacturers toward safety in their own activities as well as
in their dealings with subcontractors. Manufacturers have
no defense if a defect is traceable to poor work by a subcon-
tractor, even if a manufacturer acted reasonably in accepting
the subcontractor's component part. is0 Liability can thus be
extended to the conduct of those beyond the "control" of the
responsible enterprise.
In some limited areas, tort law has advanced this regula-
tory interest to hold an actor responsible for the conduct of a
party over whom the actor has some ability to influence, but
not to control. Psychologists, for example, are sometimes
held responsible for the conduct of their patients when the
psychologists knew of the likelihood of injury but did noth-
ing to prevent it or warn of its occurrence."' Lenders are
sometimes held responsible for the torts of their debtors,
particularly to the extent they become involved in their debt-
ors' business operations.1 2 In some situations, the tort system
imposes liability for the actions of persons clearly beyond a
defendant's control under the theory that the duty to prevent
injuries is "nondelegable."l 3
Without intending to minimize the political barriers to
an extension of enterprise liability to MCOs, we believe that
such an extension would be a modest - or at least not an
unprecedented - extension of tort principle. Further, this
purely instrumental justification squares with the rational-
izations historically offered for enterprise medical liability,
which has always been championed in part on the basis of its
ability to extend incentives to a responsible entity to reduce
risks caused by persons who otherwise would not be the
enterprise's responsibility under tort law. The heart of the
matter, however, must be a practical justification of plan-
based enterprise liability. If the imposition of enterprise
liability on plans is unlikely to lead to a reduction in medical
injuries, or if the collateral effects of such an imposition are
unacceptable, plan-based enterprise liability ought not be
pursued.
Plan-based enterprise liability "works" when it influ-
ences plans to induce providers to undertake sensible measures
to avoid medical injuries. The incentives need not be per-
fect, only worth the cost. If the analysis of the IOM is
approximately correct, the level of serious medical injury in
the American health-care delivery system is sufficiently large
to justify a considerable cost. The incentives created by a
plan-based enterprise liability system must be evaluated in
terms of their success in inducing direct providers of care to
undertake appropriate safety measures. The nature of those
safety measures, as the IOM has been at pains to point out, is
not now well understood and arguably is not yet the subject
of sufficient inquiry. The IOM has advocated for the creation
of a national Center for Patient Safety to gather information
and oversee and perform research necessary to achieve a "5 0%
reduction in errors over five years."15 4 Steps have been taken
to create such a center within the federal government."15 Steps
for systemic error reduction have been proposed in areas
such as drug administration and anesthesiology" 6 Further
steps are likely to be process-oriented performance standards
directed at safety outcomes.
The IOM has advocated that regulators, accreditors, and
purchasers require or provide incentives to providers to adopt
the forthcoming safety measures. These steps would be en-
tirely appropriate. However, screening by regulators and
accreditors has not proven in the past to do more than estab-
lish a very basic baseline; and in some instances (e.g., nursing
homes), it has failed to accomplish the enforcement of even
fundamental health and safety standards. Purchasers have a
mixed record of attention to quality measures. While some
purchaser groups are extremely engaged in quality measure-
ment and improvement measures, the market in which
health-care services are bought and sold remains startlingly
insensitive to quality issues." 7 Under such circumstances,
the medical liability system certainly retains at least an inter-
stitial role in quality assurance. The IOM recognized as much,
and agreed that the most comfortable fit between its vision
of systems-oriented quality assurance and the tort system is
enterprise liability. How such a liability system will
incentivize MCOs is clear; how they will translate that in-
centive to affect the conduct of health-care providers is not.
For reasons discussed above, MCOs are unlikely to at-
tempt to affect health-care practices through direct
management tools - that is, through directing health-care
providers in the course of their patient care duties. Nor should
they; they are simply too remote from the bedside to have
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meaningful influence in day-to-day operations. But the mea-
sures anticipated by the error-reduction movement are not
minor tinkerings on a physician-by-physician basis, but basic
process measures. One task recommended by the IOM is
the creation of "feasible prototype systems (best practices)
and tools for safety in key processes," for application in a
variety of settings, such as:
* medication systems (from prescribing to admin-
istering);
" operating rooms and surgery processes;
* emergency departments;
• management of diagnostic tests, screening, and
information;
* intensive care units;
" neonatal intensive care units;
" care of frail elderly (e.g., falls, decubitus);
" the use of simulation and simulators in health
care; and
* team training and crew resource management
applications in health care." 8
Some process measures, such as the use of computer systems
to check for prescription and administration errors, can prop-
erly be the subject of bargaining between contracting partners.
If the government's patient safety center follows through on
the creation of these prototype systems for reducing patient
injury, MCOs could require that all contracting providers
adopt the methods relevant to their practice.
MCOs would be incentivized to take this step for sev-
eral reasons in a plan-based enterprise liability system. First,
and most obviously, the requirement that its subcontractors
adopt risk-reduction protocols will, if the protocols are valid,
lessen the chances of a medical injury. Second, depending on
the shape of the enterprise liability system, such a step may
be taken into account in determining the quantum of dam-
ages for which the MCO would be responsible.159 Third, the
enforcement of such a policy would be evidence of quality
within the health plan's network, a feature that should be of
some competitive value. Thus, the incentives appear to trans-
late from the liability system, through a given health plan, to
the plan's constituent parts, notwithstanding the plan's lack
of instrumental control over health-care delivery operations.
Several implementation concerns should be noted, though
they cannot be resolved here. First, one of the justifications
for MCOs as the responsible entities is that MCOs have
contractual relationships with health-care providers in large,
small, and nonexistent institutional settings. This virtue be-
comes problematic when MCOs attempt to require
compliance with complex error-avoidance protocols, as solo-
practicing physicians are unlikely to have the resources to
comply that a large group practice would have. The proto-
cols could be produced, however, by either the federal patient
safety center or the health plans in a variety of forms suitable
for providers of different scales of practice. The Fraud and
Abuse Compliance Guidance, produced by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, is produced in such a
variety of forms. 160 The production of programmatic guid-
ance suitably scaled to different types of organizations would
blunt concerns that either larger or smaller providers would
suffer competitive consequences unrelated to safety concerns.
Second, many people are covered by government insur-
ance or by self-insuring employers. The application of
plan-based enterprise liability fits uncomfortably in both situ-
ations. Government has moved, however, to "privatizing"
public insurance, and most Medicaid recipients and many
Medicare recipients are now members of private plans. Gov-
ernment would have to make a judgment with respect to its
residual fee-for-service participants; it could either waive its
governmental immunity to suit or simply exclude those ben-
eficiaries from the liability system. The arguments for and
against liability for self-insured employers are now the sub-
ject of discussion in the context of "patients' rights" legislation
and will not be rehearsed here.
Third, many MCOs now include, due in large part to
consumer demand, a provision permitting out-of-network
benefits. These provisions permit insureds to receive partial
coverage for care from a provider with no contractual rela-
tionship with the plan. This problem is significant. On the
one hand, the solution could be to permit an exception to
enterprise liability when an insured selects an out-of-net-
work provider. The collateral consequence of such a solution
may well be to limit a very popular manifestation of patient
choice. On the other hand, we could hold plans liable under
such circumstances; the fairness of such an imposition of
liability, however, would stretch the theory to its breaking
point.
CONCLUSION
The IOM report has generated momentum toward a sys-
temic approach to medical error reduction. Two prominent
health systems researchers recently noted that "[p]olicymakers
are capable of taking action to protect human life in many
other areas, but efforts directed at the health care system
remain uncommon"; they argued that sustained attention is
needed to make progress. 61 Beyond attention, action is obvi-
ously necessary if medical injuries are to be reduced. Notably,
the IOM, in a follow-up to its 1999 study, quoted Goethe:
"Willing is not enough; we must do. '16 2 The IOM and other
respected sources agree that a campaign of blaming indi-
vidual physicians is not a prescription for improvement.
Accountability is necessary, but to be effective, reforms must
encourage systems and organizations to engineer around in-
evitable human failings.
That emphasis meshes well with proposed shifts in medi-
cal malpractice theory from a physician focus to an enterprise
focus, a theory most recently fastening on MCOs as the ap-
propriate responsible enterprise. It seems a happy coincidence.
Pushes for change in the malpractice system usually seem
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more tied to the vagaries of malpractice insurance premium
fluctuations than to patient safety. Now, however, the mo-
mentum toward error reduction might move policymakers
to consider seriously the merits of plan-based enterprise li-
ability. Enterprise liability places the incentives for
improvement with organizations of a scale sufficient to in-
fluence providers' adoption of systems-based error-reduction
methods. Health plans, unlike hospitals, have influence over
the entire range of entities and providers involved in health-
care delivery and, therefore, have the potential to encourage
system-wide safety measures.
Unfortunately, the renewed interest in enterprise liabil-
ity comes at a time when plans are decentralizing and
disengaging from direct control over patient care. The move
to enterprise liability and, specifically, plan-based enterprise
liability should nevertheless be pursued. Health plans con-
tinue to be business partners with the health-care providers
who must be encouraged to adopt the error-reduction rec-
ommendations sure to emerge from any federal patient safety
center. The financial influence health plans wield justifies
the imposition of enterprise liability; their ability to condi-
tion continued business dealings on providers' adoption of
error-reduction methods makes plan-based enterprise liabil-
ity an essential adjunct to the error-reduction movement.
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